As I’ve been reasonably successful in the past at figuring out file systems from flat files, I thought I’d have a go at the Dell Mini 3i 1.5 Firmware that surfaced at damipan (http://www.namipan.com/d/DELL_MINI3I_OMS1.5.rar/a5ba3b06ab0bfc9baeb2f09b44f54aa40bac3457ee8ebc04)
The rar file unzips to a MFF file.
This I’m probably guessing is probably named after Marvell File Format or Marvell Flasher File.
Here’s my initial work on the file system of MFF format, based on DELL_Mini3i_OMS1.5.mff
Initial 80 bytes [0x0 – 0x080] (MFF HEADER)
0x00 – 0x03 : 3 Bytes Header MFF
0x03 – 0x07 : Still to figure out, probably file length or crc.
Have to grab another firmware file to check though..
0x08 : Number of files? 9 listed, so quite probably…
Rest of header padded out with zero’s to end of 80 bytes.
[0x80 – 0x180] File Allocation Table
0x80 – our first file. Looks like 0x100 / 256 bytes per file listed, padded with 0x0’s
File listing looks like this:
File header (for each file)
8 bytes, then filename, padded with 0’s to fill 256 bytes length
First 4 bytes – offset in MFF of start of file.
Second 4 bytes – length of file.
Remaining files repeat from next 256 byte intervals.
eg
0x180 – 0x280
0x280 – 0x380
…
[0x80 + 9 files x 0x100 bytes = 0x980] Start of Data.
How did I work this out?
HEADER | Filename (not in hex below as easier to read)
80 09 00 00 34 BB 00 00 | Tavor Flasher_Samsung_ONENAND_h.bin
0x0980 is the start of our first file data, so the first 2 bytes are definitely File Start.
0xBB34 looks quite possibly like File Length.
We can check this easily with one of the plain text files.
Flash_Protection_table.ini is prefixed with 63 EA AD 09 4B 00 00 00
So it should start at 0x09 AD – hmm, readable text starts at offset 9AD D564.
Not quite right. Start offset looks close though.
Lets look at another one.
Tavor_saar_onenand.ini – prefix says
64 d5 ad 09 6f 01 00 00
Ah, 0x9 AD D5 64 is actually our Tavor_saar_onenand.ini content. Cool, a match. So, the first 4 bytes are definitely our location pointer.
Lets look at the Flash protection table again Flash_Protection_table.ini
63 EA AD 09 | 4B 00 00 00
Should start at 09 AD EA 63, and go for 4B length. Bingo, it does π
Our file contents for that area are:
[PROTECTED_REGION_0]
Block_Offset=0x100000
Length=0x20000
Mode=SKIP_BLOCKS
So, now we can start to split the files apart into their associated parts.
factory_BENZ2GWIFI.fbf is probably going to be the most interesting, as its the largest.
That starts at 0xC564, length of 0x09AD1000 and starts with “Marvell_FBF”
Basic math says that 0x9ADD564 (0x09AD1000 + 0xC564) should be our end of file.
Well, it is, as we know flash protection table.ini starts at 9add564.
So, should be fairly easy with that info to write an unpacker tool to rip out the first interior files from the MFF file format.
Some of the files inside are also “packed”, but those appear to be fairly easy to rip apart also π
I’m guessing with a bit more work I’ll be able to replace parts of the firmware with different versions quite soonish.
The file I’m using off of namipan has the following files inside:
TavorFlasher_SAMSUNG_ONENAND_h.bin
TavorFlasher_SAMSUNG_ONENAND_TIM.bin
factory_BENZ2GWIFI.fbf
Tavor_SAAR_OneNAND.ini
factory_BENZ2GWIFI.mff.mlt
magic_fbf.ini
magic_fbf_inner.ini
NTIM_fbw.ini
Flash_Protection_Table.ini
I’m guessing that our fbf file will probably be able to be split into parts as per our ntim_fbw.ini data.
FBF = Flash Binary Format?
some interesting files listed
ntim.bin – non trusted image module?
blob_full.bin – from the borq’s blob gz?
Tavor_M05_Poleg_AI_B0_Flash.bin – tavor = our product chip, as we’re running on a Marvel PXA935 (aka Tavor-P65)
Interesting thing of note – our OEM UniqueID: 0xF00F00 in Unicode is what glyph?
Hint – its not an orange, or a pear π
NTIM_fbw.ini
Version: 0x030102
Trusted: 0Issue Date: 0x08142006
OEM UniqueID: 0xf00f00
Boot Flash Signature: 0x4e414e02
Number of Images: 10
Size of Reserved in bytes: 0x40Image ID: 0x54494D48
Next Image ID: 0x4F424D49
Flash Entry Address: 0x0
Load Address: 0x5c008000
Image Size To CRC in bytes: 0x0
Image Filename: NTIM.binImage ID: 0x4F424D49
Next Image ID: 0x4F534C4F
Flash Entry Address: 0x20000
Load Address: 0x5c013000
Image Size To CRC in bytes: 0x0
Image Filename: obm_full.binImage ID: 0x4F534C4F
Next Image ID: 0x5349474E
Flash Entry Address: 0x80000
Load Address: 0x83000000
Image Size To CRC in bytes: 0x0
Image Filename: blob_full.binImage ID: 0x5349474E
Next Image ID: 0x494D4549
Flash Entry Address: 0x00120000
Load Address: 0x84000000
Image Size To CRC in bytes: 0x0
Image Filename: signature_full.binImage ID: 0x494D4549
Next Image ID: 0x4152424C
Flash Entry Address: 0x00100000
Load Address: 0xBFEE0000
Image Size To CRC in bytes: 0x0
Image Filename: reliable_full.binImage ID: 0x4152424C
Next Image ID: 0x47524249
Flash Entry Address: 0x00140000
Load Address: 0xBF600000
Image Size To CRC in bytes: 0x0
Image Filename: arbel_full.binImage ID: 0x47524249
Next Image ID: 0x62746C67
Flash Entry Address: 0x00840000
Load Address: 0xBFF00000
Image Size To CRC in bytes: 0x0
Image Filename: tavor_full.binImage ID: 0x62746C67
Next Image ID: 0x70636C67
Flash Entry Address: 0x00A00000
Load Address: 0xBF300000
Image Size To CRC in bytes: 0x0
Image Filename: bootlogo_full.binImage ID: 0x70636C67
Next Image ID: 0x464F5441
Flash Entry Address: 0x00A20000
Load Address: 0x8F300000
Image Size To CRC in bytes: 0x0
Image Filename: prechangelogo_full.binImage ID: 0x464F5441
Next Image ID: 0xFFFFFFFF
Flash Entry Address: 0x0EA40000
Load Address: 0x80100000
Image Size To CRC in bytes: 0x0
Image Filename: fota_full.binReserved Data:
0x4F505448
0x00000002
0x55415254
0x00000010
0x00004646
0x00000001
0x50524F49
0x00000020
0x00000002
0x00000000
0x00000000
0x00000000
0x00000001
0x00000000
0x5465726D
0x00000008
Flash_Protection_Table.ini
[PROTECTED_REGION_0]
Block_Offset=0x100000
Length=0x20000
Mode=SKIP_BLOCKS
magic_fbf_inner.ini
[INTEL_FLASH_DEVICE_INPUT_FILE]
Number_of_Images=20[IMAGE_HEADER_0]
Start_Address=0xfa00000
Image_Length=0x80000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=0
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_1]
Start_Address=0xdd40000
Image_Length=0x800000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=0
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_2]
Start_Address=0xeb40000
Image_Length=0x8c0000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=0
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_3]
Filename=NTIM.bin
Start_Address=0x00000000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_4]
Filename=Arbel_NVM_SAC_NOCOMMRTC.bin
Start_Address=0x00140000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_5]
Filename=blob
Start_Address=0x00080000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_6]
Start_Address=0x0bd40000
Image_Length=0x02000000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=0
VerifyWrite=0
[IMAGE_HEADER_7]
Filename=opl.img.yaffs
Start_Address=0x0bd40000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_8]
Filename=ramdisk_len.img
Start_Address=0x00c40000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_9]
Filename=ramdisk-recovery_len.img
Start_Address=0x00cc0000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_10]
Start_Address=0x00d40000
Image_Length=0x08000000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=0
VerifyWrite=0
[IMAGE_HEADER_11]
Filename=system.img.yaffs
Start_Address=0x00d40000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_12]
Filename=TAVOR_LINUX_NTOBM.bin
Start_Address=0x00020000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_13]
Filename=Tavor_M05_Poleg_AI_B0_Flash.bin
Start_Address=0x00840000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_14]
Start_Address=0x08d40000
Image_Length=0x03000000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=0
VerifyWrite=0
[IMAGE_HEADER_15]
Filename=userdata.img.yaffs
Start_Address=0x08d40000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_16]
Filename=zImage
Start_Address=0x00a40000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_17]
Filename=prdcfg.bin
Start_Address=0x00940000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_18]
Filename=precharge_logo.out
Start_Address=0x00a20000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0[IMAGE_HEADER_19]
Filename=logo_pic.gz.out
Start_Address=0x00a00000
EraseBlocks=1
WriteImage=1
VerifyWrite=0
Lastly, hi to the people at http://www.allphone.com.cn π
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